

KAPOK # 1212

VIA: AIR POUCH  
(Specify air or sea pouch)

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Dispatch No. E 3

## SECURITY INFORMATION

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CLASSIFICATIONTo : Chief, SE  
Attn: E

Date 22 December 1952

FROM : Senior Representative, E 3

SUBJECT: GENERAL- BGFIEND/Operational  
SPECIFIC- Recapitulation, BGFIEND Operations, 1 January 1952 to 31  
December 1952, as Requested by VALUABLE

1. Attached herewith is a recapitulation of BGFIEND's operations for the year of 1952 to be passed to VALUABLE's representative in Washington, as requested by E 3 during his recent trip to Athens.

2. It will be noted that BGFIEND's Willow and Fig operations are the only ones included in this report. As previously agreed upon between Headquarters and the field, Apple was considered as a DYCLEMATIS operation in our reporting to VALUABLE. Although both Apple and Throttler operations were included on the recapitulation of BGFIEND's operations for 1952 ( ), they have been omitted on the enclosed report for VALUABLE.

3. As this office is now handling all Albanian operations, we would appreciate receiving a directive stating exactly what operational information we will in the future pass on to VALUABLE.

4. A copy of the attached report is not being handed to E 3. We are informing him that this information is being delivered by Headquarters to the VALUABLE representative in Washington.

Attachment herewith:  
Report for VALUABLE

## Distribution:

Wash: 3  
Chrono: 1  
Subject: 1  
XO: 2  
BGFIEND: 2

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CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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Attachment to                     

Recapitulation, BGFIEND Operations, 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952  
As Requested by VALUABLE

A. Agent Operations

1. Infiltrtees

a. Overland

Willow            5 men  
Fig                5 men

b. Total Agents Infiltrated            10

2. Infiltrations:

Willow - 1st trip    4 men  
          2nd trip    5 men  
          3rd trip    5 men

Fig                    5 men

Total infiltrations                    19

3. Casualties:

a. Killed        - 0

b. Captured     - 0

4. Agents Unaccounted for:            0

5. Exfiltrtees

Willow            5 men  
Fig                5 men  
Pine (1951)    4 men

Total Agents Exfiltrated            14

6. Aborted Operations:

Cedar            (2 man team)  
Obsession (2 man team)

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B. Air Operations

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B. Air Operations

1. Leaflet Drops

x	21 Jan	156,000	leaflets	57,000	Shqiperia
x	27 Feb	150,000	"	5,000	"
	3 Mar	100,000	"	50,000	"
	30 Mar	40,000	"		
*	8 May	118,000	"	175,000	"
*	6 Jul	500,000	"	54,000	"
	28 Jul	547,000	"	150,000	"
*	4 Aug	227,000	"	5,000	"
**	2 Sep	107,000	"		
	5 Sep	241,000			
*	6 Sep	250,000			
	10 Oct	<u>500,000</u>	"		
Totals:		2,936,000	leaflets	496,000	Shqiperia
				<u>2,936,000</u>	

Grand Total: 3,432,000

2. Propaganda Supply Drops

	21 Jan	900	cans	250	1 lb. bags flour
	27 Feb	<u>1470</u>	"	<u>250</u>	1 lb. " "
Totals		2370	cans	500	1 lb. bags flour

3. Dummy Drop

2 Sep

4. Total Number Covert Air Missions: 12

x Combined with Propaganda supply  
\* Cover for supply mission  
\*\* Combined with dummy drop

C. Conclusions

1. The results of our 1951 operations dictated a thorough review of our operational procedures and techniques. As a result of this review, the following measures were adopted in the planning for 1952 operations in an effort to improve our record:

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a. The emphasis in

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a. The emphasis in our agent recruitment was placed on quality rather than quantity. 10 volunteers of higher mental calibre and motivation were selected for training and infiltration during 1952, as opposed to 39 agents of mediocre to poor quality in 1951.

b. Unlike 1951, no volunteers were selected from the Albanian Guard company nor was the Military Junta of the N.C.F.A. asked to recommend potential agents. Our decision not to utilize these sources of personnel was based on our experience with Albanians we took into our confidence in the past. They succeeded in violating every security precaution we instructed them to observe.

c. The N.C.F.A. and its Military Junta were completely divorced from all operations and were given no operational information.

d. No blind parachute drops were made during the 1952 season. All team infiltrations were made overland. Personnel and supply air drops were only made to reception committees at pre-arranged D/Z's. Had the necessary maritime support facilities been available, sea infiltration and exfiltration would also have been used in some cases.

e. We recognized the necessity for a faster method of dispatching re-supply containers from our covert aircraft. The release of containers from the aircraft in a few second's time is impossible, however, when each cumbersome container must be manhandled through the door by two dispatchers. To date, this problem remains unsolved.

2. The overall results of the agent operations conducted during 1952 seem to justify our adoption of the above measures. A solution to the problem in e. above should permit us to substantially improve our effectiveness during 1953.

Friend

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